NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Volume 17

Number 2

Article 4

Spring 1992

Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau: The Second
Circuit Aborts a Nation by Preferring Ceremonialism to Actual
Exercises of Sovereign Capacity
Henry Michael Perlowski

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj

Recommended Citation
Henry M. Perlowski, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau: The Second Circuit Aborts a Nation
by Preferring Ceremonialism to Actual Exercises of Sovereign Capacity, 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. 311 (1992).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol17/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in North Carolina Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau: The Second Circuit Aborts a
Nation by Preferring Ceremonialism to Actual Exercises of Sovereign Capacity
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law

This note is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol17/iss2/
4

NOTES
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau:
The Second Circuit Aborts a Nation by
Preferring Ceremonialism to Actual
Exercises of Sovereign Capacity
I. Introduction
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"),I federal
and state courts determine the jurisdiction of foreign entities by ana-

lyzing standards developed in international law. 2 Since federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any civil action involving a
foreign state, 3 the central question for jurisdictional purposes is
whether a legitimate "foreign state" is before the court. Traditionally, sovereignty consists of four components: a defined territory, a
permanent population, the control of internal government, and the
capacity to conduct foreign relations. 4 Although these basic criteria

are firmly established in international law, the substantive requirements of each component are often vaguely defined. 5 When an en6
tity is in a transitional stage and is moving towards independence,
courts must determine statehood without consistent legal guidance

regarding the often nebulous concepts of governmental control and
7

international capacity.
In Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau,8 the Second CirI Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1988).
2 See Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1243 (2d Cir.
1991).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988).
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 201 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED)].

The terms "state" and "sovereign"

are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
5 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 74-76 (3d ed. 1979)

(suggests that the four components standing alone do not provide a working definition of
statehood).
6 See Louis HENKIN et. al, INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 229-30 (2d ed.

1987) (statehood issues are prevalent when governments operate without complete autonomy and when nations emerge under the shadow of established states).
7 See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 4, § 201 cmt. a (1987). In unusual cases,
"issues of statehood have been resolved by the practice of states reflecting political expe-

diency as much as logical consistency." Id.
8 924 F.2d at 1237 (2d Cir. 1991).
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cuit ruled that a strategic trust territory administered by the United
States under the auspices of the United Nations, 9 was not a foreign
state under section 1330 of the FSIA. t0 Contrary to the district
court's finding of jurisdiction based on Palau's defacto sovereign status,t I the appellate court adopted a rigid approach to statehood and
held that Morgan Guaranty Trust's motion to remand to state court
was improperly denied.12 By reading the directions of international
law very narrowly, the court developed a test requiring formal indications of sovereignty before granting federal jurisdiction to transitional entities. ' 3
The heart of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. controversy centered
around Palau's inability to ratify the United States proposal of the
Compact of Free Association: a relationship giving Palau a lucrative
aid package and a greater degree of international freedom in return
for certain military privileges. 14 Since the Reagan administration's
offer to relax the current trust arrangement hinged on the U.S. Defense Department's right to maintain a nuclear presence in the
area, 15 the Compact had to be ratified under Palau's constitution,
which conditioned such military activity on popular approval granted
in special votes called plebescites.1 6 The inability of Palau's voters to
reach the 75 percent majority necessary to trigger the new relationship with the United States stood as the primary reason why the Sec9 The Republic of Palau is one of four island units currently comprising the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), established under the United Nations Charter.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-91; see Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated
islands, July 18, 1947, U.S.-U.N. Security Council, 61 Stat. 3301 [hereinafter Trusteeship
Agreement]. Palau is an archipelago consisting of approximately 200 islands, and is inhabited by fewer than fifteen thousand people. The Republic's principal means of existence is
an active fishing trade, but recently, recreational diving opportunities have opened the
possibility of a tourist market. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1238. The entire
Trust Territory area is commonly known as "Micronesia." See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text for the relevant history of the Trust Territories and Palau.
10 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1247.
11 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 716
(S.D.N.Y.1986), vacated, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991). The district court examined
whether Palau "effectively" met the requirements of statehood, since defacto sovereignty is
an "often used concept.., to evaluate... jurisdiction over nations in political transition."
Id. at 713.
12 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1247.
13 See id. at 1244-46.
14 Recent Development, Compacts of Free Association in the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands: Plebiscite in the Republic of Palau, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149, 153 (1988) [hereinafter
Compacts ofFreeAssociation]. See Compact of Free Association Between the United States and
the Government of Palau, Pub. L. No. 99-658, 100 Stat. 3672 (1986) [hereinafter Compact]; see infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text for further elaboration on the Palaun
rejection of the Compact.
15 Compact, supra note 14, tit. III, art. III, § 331, 100 Stat. at 3696.
16 See REPUBLIC OF PALAU CONST. art. II, § 3, reprinted in Compacts of Free Association,
supra note 14, at 152 n.14. "[A]ny such agreement which authorizes use, testing, storage
or disposal of nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare shall require approval of not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in such
referendum." Id.
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ond Circuit overruled the de facto sovereignty claim. 17 Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. developed a clear standard for future jurisdictional
disputes by relying on formal indicia of statehood, but precluded a
broader examination of the diverse issues central to Palau's emerging international status.
This Note examines the criteria of statehood in international law
as interpreted by the federal courts and focuses on sovereignty issues
within the context of the FSIA and the Trusteeship Agreement governing the Republic of Palau. Part II of this Note elaborates on the
facts and holdings of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. decisions. Part III
outlines the historical development of the Trust Territories. Part IV
examines legal background materials and consists of three major
subsections: (1) an overview of the purposes of the FSIA; (2) a discussion of the components of statehood and defacto sovereignty; and
(3) a synopsis of case applications involving sovereignty issues and
the Trust Territories. Part V analyzes the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
decision by focusing on whether the Second Circuit's narrow view of
statehood was more appropriate than the district court's emphasis
on unifying the principles of transitional sovereignty with the
broader aims of the Trusteeship System. To address this issue, this
Note (1) analyzes the "formalist test" in light of the diverse case law
addressing transitional statehood and the status of the Trust Territories; and (2) considers the practical effects of the Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co. opinion on both the FSIA's policies and the Trusteeship
System's basic premises. This Note concludes that the Second Circuit developed a standard contrary to both the clear directions of
Congress and the case law supporting defacto sovereignty. Furthermore, the court ignored the basic terms of the Trusteeship Agreement by implicitly approving the United States' use of the Compact
of Free Association to halt the continuing expansion of self-government within the Republic, for the benefit of our nation's own political desires. ' 8
17 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1246 ("Such approval would have marked
the entry of Palau into the final stage of its transition to self-government and would have
signalled the certain and unavoidable termination of the Trusteeship."). If the Palaun voters amassed at least a 75% approval rate, the subsequent ratification of the free association
agreement would have conferred sovereign status on the Republic. See id.; United States v.
Covington, 783 F.2d 1052, 1055 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986) ("The
result of free association status is that ... the district is afforded full internal self government. Consequently, we treat the confession as if it had had been taken in what was undeniably a foreign country.").
18 See Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9, art. 6, 61 Stat. at 3302-03. Article 6 provides that United States has the duty to "[floster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory and shall promote the development ...

toward

self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of
the Trust Territory and its peoples and [to] the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
Id.
concerned...
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The Facts and Holdings of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
Decisions
A.

The Facts Before the District Court 19

The origins of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. case derive from
Palau's efforts to finance a proposal made by International Power
Systems Co. Ltd. of London to construct an electrical power plant
and fuel storage facility on the archipelago.2 0 A syndicate of banks,
including Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., presented a loan package to
Palaun officials under the premise that the project would be self-financing. 2 ' After Palau's President Remelik signed the loan agreements with the syndicate and Britain's Export Credit Guaranty
Department ("ECGD"), a tumultuous process ensued to determine if
the Republic's chief executive had the authority to execute the
deal. 22 Although the United States representative supervising Palau's Congress suspended the enabling legislation, 23 the U.S. State
Department assured the British government that the Compact would
24
provide the necessary funds to meet the archipelago's obligations.
The deal was completed despite a last minute effort by the U.S. De25
partment of Interior to stall the loan.
Nearly two years later, Palau defaulted on the loan and conse19 Since sovereignty is considered an "ephemeral concept," jurisdictional
determinations must reflect the factual status before a court at the time of that court's
decision, and not at the traditional time of the filing of the complaint. Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co., 639 F. Supp. at 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), vacated, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991); see
also United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 223 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Although the notion of an appellate court considering events occurring after the district
court decision is counter-intuitive to basic judicial review, sovereignty cannot be reduced
to a "jurisdictional moment." Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 639 F. Supp. at 712. This
paradox necessitates two separate fact sections to fully understand the reasoning of each
court.
20 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1241.
21 Id. The lead bank, Morgan Grenfell, represented that it "could not agree or disagree as to revenue projections but was relying on Palau's 'sovereign risk' for repayment."
Id.
22 The mayor of Palau's principal state challenged the loan as a government-to-government transaction violative of local law. Id. The Attorney General of Palau and representatives of ECGD determined that legislation was necessary to insure President Remelik
had authority to waive sovereign immunity and insure repayment of the loan. Id. The
Palaun legislature soon passed local law RPPK 1-54, which established a revolving Project
Fund to pay the principal and interest owed to the syndicate and ECGD, and authorized a
waiver of sovereign immunity. Id.
23 See Secretarial Order No. 2918, 34 Fed. Reg. 157, 157 (1968) [hereinafter Secretarial Order 2918]. The United States High Commissioner reports and counsels the Department of the Interior regarding the international obligations and legislative capacity of the
Trust Territory. Id.
24 A "Note Verbale" sent by the State Department stated that Palau would have access to $28,000,000 when the Compact of Free Association took effect. Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1242.
25 Contrary to its prior assertions that the project would be self-financing, the Department of Interior realized Palau could not service the debt. Id. A letter was sent to
President Remelik, to delay completing the deal, but the advice was not relayed to VicePresident Oiterong, who signed the loan papers. Id.
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quently the guarantor bank syndicate had to reimburse the primary
lender thirty-five million dollars. 26 Pursuant to the loan's recourse
agreement, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. and the other banks filed a
27
suit for recovery on the debt in the Supreme Court of New York.
The Republic of Palau then removed the action to the United States
District Court, 28 relying on the jurisdictional principles discussed in
the FSIA. 2 9 The banks then motioned for remand back to state court
claiming removal was improper since Palau was not a "foreign
state."

30

B.

The District Court's Decision

The district court denied the banks' motion to remand and
awarded Palau defacto sovereignty, even though the Trust Territory
3
did not fit neatly within the traditional definitions of statehood. '

While the Trusteeship Agreement still remained in place and considerably limited Palau's ability to act independently,3 2 the court focused on both the Republic's proximity to free association 33 and the
basic goals of the original trust relationship.3 4 Through recent advances in internal self-government 35 and the Compact's recognition
that Palau was ready to enter into free association, 36 the court held
that the entity had "effectively" achieved sovereign status. The court
said to further delay "triggering the need to accord Palau the dignity
37
of an equal sovereign" would contradict the goals of the FSIA.
26 Id.

27 The enforcement provision allowed an action in state court because the commercial exception clause in the FSIA made the issue of actual sovereign immunity moot. See
id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). See also infra note 29.
28 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(d) (1988) states that "[a]ny action brought in state court against
a foreign state ... may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the United
States...... Id.
29 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1988) (district court has original jurisdiction over claims involving foreign states). Proper jurisdiction under section 1330 and appropriate removal under
section 1441 (d) both depend on section 1602 and its incorporation of international law to
determine statehood. While the commercial activities exception would defeat an ultimate
claim of immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), Palau used the FSIA to attain federal jurisdiction. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1242.
30 Id. at 1238.
31 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 639 F. Supp. at 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), vacated, 924 F.2d
1237 (2d Cir. 1991).
32 Id. at 713.
33 At the time of the district court's decision, the Compact still had a chance of ratification. Id. at 714. The court clearly recognized that steps remained before the Trusteeship dissolved, but regarded the process of official termination as "formalist indicia." Id. at
716.
34 See id.at 714-15.
35 Id. at 714-16.
36 Id. at 714. The court emphasized the Compact's acknowledgement that "[tihe
people of Palau, acting through their duly elected government established under their
constitution, are self governing." Id (emphasis added).
37 Id. at 716; See also infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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38
Subsequent Facts Before the Second Circuit

Once the district court determined it had jurisdiction, the banks'
were awarded a forty-six million dollar judgment, since the project
was considered a private action falling under the commercial activities exception to general immunity. 39 After the Palaun people failed
to ratify the Compact, 40 the government reversed its position and
chose to appeal the substantial judgment, claiming sovereignty was
improperly granted by the lower court. 4 1
D.

The Second Circuit's Decision

In reversing the district court's finding of de facto sovereignty,
the Second Circuit examined the traditional requirements of statehood, in light of Palau's failure to ratify the Compact. 4 2 With the
free association movement in abeyance as a result of the Compact's
nuclear rights reservation, 43 the court concluded that the factual
foundation of "effective" sovereignty was undermined. 4 4 Thus, the
statehood issue returned to an examination of the elements of governmental authority and international capacity permitted by the original Trusteeship Mandate. 4 5 Despite the progress made by Palau in
developing an internal government, the trust relationship limited Palau's self-governing capacity to matters consistent with the objectives
of the United States. 46 For example, the Republic's laws can be suspended by a High Commissioner appointed by the United States, the
High Court of Palau consists of justices appointed by the Department of the Interior, and the Republic's capacity to enter foreign
agreements is subject to approval by the administering authority. 4 7
See supra note 19.
39 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 693 F. Supp. 1479, 1499
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988) (In the commercial activities clause,
the FSIA codifies the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity, which limits immunity to
public functions.). Previously, the bank's motion for summary judgment was denied. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 657 F. Supp. 1475, 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Additionally, Palau's attempt to dismiss the action was rejected. Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Republic of Palau, 680 F. Supp. 99, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (joint resolution of Congress, intended to confer immunity on Palau, rendered invalid).
40 See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
41 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1237. Whether this dramatic change in legal
position by the Palaun government was the product of chutzpah or dire financial circumstances will be addressed later. See infra notes 192, 208-11 and accompanying text.
42 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1244-45.
43 See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
44 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1244-46. The end to the Trusteeship
Agreement was no longer "certain and unavoidable," id. at 1246, and the "ties between
the United States and Palau were [no longer] in the process of withering away." Id.
45 d. at 1245.
38

46 Id.
47 Secretarial Order No. 3039, 44 Fed. Reg. 28,116, 28,117-18 (1979) [hereinafter

Secretarial Order No. 3039] (order establishing and limiting the specific governmental
bodies of Palau). The Second Circuit commented that "[a] more wide-ranging authority to
govern is hard to imagine. The United States exercised that authority at the time of the
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According to the Second Circuit, the high degree of control retained
by the United States inherently precluded true sovereignty and also
prevented federal jurisdiction pursuant to section 1330 of the
FSIA.

48

The Second Circuit altered the district court's analysis by taking
a different perspective on how to apply sovereignty issues within the
context of the Trusteeship Agreement and FSIA. While the lower
court continually referred to the broad aims of the trust scheme 49
and the legislative purposes demonstrated in tl~e FSIA, 50 the Second
Circuit demanded a "moment" or "event" when sovereignty tangibly vested in the Republic. 5 1 The court's rejection of defacto sovereignty focused on the formal confines of the Trusteeship's structure,
and ignored the recent movements made by Palau towards independence. 52 Additionally, by stressing that Palau was no longer claiming
to be sovereign, 53 the court signalled its preference for simple tests
of statehood, rather than examining the motives behind Palau's sudden change of heart. 54 Collectively, the factors culminating in the
Second Circuit's decision presented one overriding theme: formulating a clear standard to decide all questions of statehood was the
court's primary concern, even if a formal test subjugated the intertransactions giving rise to this action, and continues to exercise it." Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co., 924 F.2d at 1244. The court emphasized the actions by the High Commissioner in
suspending the enabling legislation giving President Remelik authority to enter into a government-to-government transaction. Id. at 1244-45.
48 Id. at 1244.
49 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 639 F. Supp. at 715-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), vacated, 924
F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991). "[T]o construe the United States as a cog in the independent
machine of the Trusteeship is to misconstrue the United States role in the creation of the
system ... ." id. at 715, and to misconstrue the subsequent development in the
archipelago.
50 Id. at 716. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text. The Second Circuit did
not discuss the purposes of the FSIA in its opinion. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at
1237-47.
51 See id. at 1246. "Our conclusion may well have been different had the Compact of
Free Association been fully approved by the parties to the Compact." Id.
52 By definition, defacto sovereignty recognizes that one or more steps are still required before formal statehood vests. The district court's analysis continually emphasized
the strides Palau made since the ratification of its Constitution and the examples of practical sovereignty asserted by the Republic. Passing the Compact would be the "step needed
to complete the transition from 'de facto' status to formal status as a foreign state." Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co., 639 F. Supp. at 716. The Second Circuit rejected this notion of transitional sovereignty and indicated that the final step must have occurred, or be certain to
occur in the immediate future to vest sovereignty in the Trust Territory. Morgan Guaranty
Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1246. See infra notes 169-79 and accompanying text for a thorough
analysis of the Second Circuit's attitude toward defacto statehood.
53 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1246.
54 Although the Restatement says an entity is not a state if it does not claim to be a
state, RESTATEMENT (REvIsED), supra note 4, § 201 cmt. f,the relevance of Palau's position

is admittedly tempered by the Republic's assertion that "the aspirations of its people to
become sovereign continue to make such sovereignty inevitable." Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co., 924 F.2d at 1246 (quoting Palau's supplemental brief). By taking Palau's brief at face
value, the Second Circuit ignored the Republic's obvious economic motives for denying
sovereignty, and the clearly expressed wishes of its people. Id.
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ests of both the statutes 5 5 and the foreign entity involved, as well as
the continuing viability of defacto sovereignty.
III.

Historical Background

After the Second World War, the United States realized the importance of maintaining a permanent security interest in the South
Pacific basin. 56 Accordingly, the United States proposed a strategic
trust relationship with the islands formerly controlled by Japan. 57 In
1947, the United States and the Security Council of the United Nations signed a bilateral treaty, establishing the Trusteeship Mandate
and incorporating it into the UN Charter. 58 The four basic objectives of the strategic trust reflected the dual goals of promoting development in Micronesia and preserving international peace in the
59
Pacific Basin.
Although the United States has clear responsibilities as the Administering Authority of the Trust, the first movement towards selfgovernment in the region did not occur until 1968.60 While the
United States maintained direct control over the internal government of the islands, an executive body, a bicameral legislature, and a
55 If transitional entities could deny sovereignty on appeal, they could always delay
paying debts by jumping back and forth from federal to state court. The removal statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988), cannot be construed to circumvent logical civil procedure and
treat creditors so unfairly. See also infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text for an analysis of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.'s impact on the FSIA. •
56 The former Japanese Mandated Islands, consisting of the Marshalls, the Marianas,
and the Carolines, "formed a deep, well-defended barrier" in the South Pacific that harbored Japanese air and naval operations during World War II. Submission of U.S. Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Japanese Mandated Islands, 16 DEP'T ST. BULL. 416, 416 (1947)
[hereinafter Draft Trusteeship Agreement]. The United States lost "tens of thousands" of lives
during years of fighting to drive Japan away from these islands. Id. at 417.
57 Id. at 416-23. The strategic trust was a compromise between competing U.S. policy factions as the military demanded outright annexation of the territories, while the State
Department adopted a vigorous anti-colonial stance and argued for less control. Lizabeth
A. McKibben, The PoliticalRelationship Between the United States and Pacific Island Entities: The
Path to Self-Government in the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, and Guam, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J.
257, 267 n.51 (1990).
58 U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-91; Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9.
59 U.N. CHARTER art. 76 states the essential objectives:
(a) to further international peace and security;
(b) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement
of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate
to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned .... ;
(c) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
.... ; and
(d) to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters
for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals ....
Id.
60 Secretarial Order No. 2918, supra note 23, at 157. (twenty years after the strategic
trust was formed, the Department of the Interior finally declared "the United States has
undertaken to promote self government in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
. . . .1").
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local judiciary system were established for the Trust Territory. 6' After the Trusteeship was divided into four regions for administrative
purposes, 62 the United States reaffirmed the self-governing abilities
63
of each island group.
As a separate Micronesian entity, the Republic of Palau adopted
and ratified its own constitution in 198164 and sought to establish a
more independent relationship with the United States. 6 5 The parties
discussed entering a free association arrangement similar to the relationships already granted to the Marshall Islands and the Federated
States of Micronesia, 6 6 but the nuclear provision in Palau's constitution hindered the negotiations. 67 The United States' proposed version of free association tried to circumvent the military restrictions in
Palau's constitution, but clearly threatened the Republic's exercise of
self-determination. "The United States required . .. as a condition
precedent to free association, that Palau make a showing that, under
its Constitution, the United States has authority to carry out its defense responsibilities under the Compact."' 68 Despite heavy and
often violent pressure placed on the anti-nuclear activists, Palau's
61 Id. at 157-60.
62 Prior to 1979, four separate political entities were formed in the region: the
Northern Marianas Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and
Palau. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1239 (2d Cir.
1991).
63 Secretarial Order No. 3039, supra note 47, at 28,116 ("The purpose of this Order
is to provide the maximum permissible amount of self government consistent with the
responsibilities of the Secretary ....").While the United States' authority to supervise
and veto the actions of Palau's government remained untouched, significant strides were
made by increasing the internal capacity of the Republic's political organs. See id. at
28,117-18.
64 After the initial Palaun Constitutional Convention adopted a draft containing two
anti-nuclear provisions, which received 92% of the popular vote, the legislature repealed
the Convention's enabling legislation after hearing the United States' objections. Douglas
R. MacGray, Note, The Law in Palau Becomes Clearer While Its Political Status Becomes More
Clouded, Gibbons v. Salii, Civ. No. 101-86 (Republic of Palau App. Div. Sept. 1986), 11
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 533, 539-40 (1987). However, only 31% of the Palaun people
approved the version not containing a nuclear limitation. Id. at 540. A third vote established a constitution similar to the first draft. Id.; see supra note 16 for the current nuclear
provision.
65 The UN Charter and the Trusteeship Mandate both failed to provide for a procedure to terminate the Trusteeship when a specific territory developed self-governing abilities. See McKibben, supra note 57, at 266 n.50. Six years after the origin of the
Trusteeship, the General Assembly defined three acceptable outcomes for a trust system:
(1) independence; (2) free association with the formerly administering state; and (3) integration within the administering state. G.A. Res. 742, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., 459 plen.
mtg., Supp. No. 17, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953).
66 See Compacts of Free Association, supra note 14, at 151 n.10.
67 ArthurJ. Armstrong & Howard L. Hills, The Negotiations for the Future Political Status
of Micronesia (1980-1984),

78 AM. J. INT'L. L. 484, 488 (1984).

68 Id. The Compact states:
[Tihe Government of the United States shall not use, test, store or dispose of
nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare and the Government of Palau assures the Government of the United
States that in carrying out its security and defense responsibilities under this
Title, the Government of the United States has the right to operate nuclear
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voters failed to supply the required majority to pass constitutional
muster. 6 9 After four failed plebescites, the Republic's chief executive, who was a consistently strong supporter of the Compact and its
proposed economic salvation, 70 tried to force ratification. 7 1 This underhanded attempt to avoid Palau's constitution was rejected by the
local judiciary, and as a result, the Compact controversy remains in
limbo. 72
IV.

Legal Background
A.

The Legislative Goals of the FSIA

Although the FSIA makes no attempt to define what criteria
transform a foreign entity into a foreign state capable of exercising
immunity in the federal courts, 73 certain underlying themes throughout the statute should influence the resolution of difficult cases. By
codifying the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity, 74 the
FSIA's main goal is to depoliticize determinations ofjurisdiction and
remove crucial immunity decisions from the hands of the State Decapable or nuclear propelled vessels and aircraft within the jurisdiction of
Palau ....
Compare Compact, supra note 14, § 324, 100 Stat. at 3695, with REPUBLIC OF PALAU CONST.
art. II, § 3, supra note 16, reprinted in Compacts of Free Association, supra note 14, at 152 n. 14.
In the "shall not" passage, the Compact used the identical language present in Palau's
constitution to try to avoid a plebescite jeopardizing ratification. S. REP. No. 403, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6207, 6230-31 [hereinafter S. REP.
No. 403].
69 The first plebescite, held on February 10, 1983, received 62% of the vote and the
second plebescite, held on September 4, 1984, received 67% of the vote. S. REP. No. 403,
supra note 68, at 6209. The Compact was then amended to include the comparable language to Palau's constitution, see supra note 68, but the new version only received 72%,
66%, 68%, and 73% of the vote in four subsequent plebescites held in 1986 and 1987.
McKibben, supra note 57, at 277 n. 110. See infra notes 210-11 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the violence surrounding the Compact controversy.
70 MacGray, supra note 64, at 541-43; see Compact, supra note 14, §§ 21 l(a)-(f, 221(b),
100 Stat. at 3687-88, 3690.
71 MacGray, supra note 64, at 543 (Salii tried to certify a plebescite with only 72% of
the vote, and send it to Washington for final approval).
72 A group of Palaun citizens sought and obtained injunctive relief against the enacting of the Compact. Gibbons v. Salii, Civ. No. 101-86, 1, 27-28 (Rep. Palau App. Div.
1986). The appellate court emphasized the history behind the ratification of Palau's constitution, and upheld the 75% approval requirement. Id. at 9-18.
73 Section 1603 is titled "definitions," but the reference to a "foreign state" only
indicates what organizations within a previously recognized state may be attributed to the
state itself. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988).
74 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount
in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state.., as to any
claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
Id. Section 1605(a)(2) follows the restrictive principle by only allowing sovereign immunity for the public actions of a foreign state, and not for commercial activities. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2) (1988).
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partment. 75 Congress clearly intends the federal courts to have
broad jurisdiction, hoping to remedy the continual "disparate treatment of cases involving 'foreign governments.' "76 To avoid the
political frictions that previously dominated sovereignty issues, the
drafters of the FSIA have indicated a clear forum preference by stating that "[i]n view of the potential sensitivities of actions against foreign states and the importance of developing a uniform body of law
in this area, it is important to give foreign states clear authority to
remove to a Federal forum action brought against them in the State
courts."' 77 Furthermore, certain procedural advantages are given to

disputes involving foreign governments, to facilitate federal jurisdic78
tion under section 1330 of the Act.

Recognizing the increasing contact of American citizens and foreign entities, the FSIA also attempts to provide certainty for litigants. 79 The ability of a private party to attain relief against a
foreign state cannot depend on political considerations and the vacillating whims of the executive branch.8 0 Accordingly, the commercial
activities exception is a significant incentive for international business, because the federal courts provide a forum for plaintiffs to recover unpaid debts, regardless of the political consequences of a
judgment. Additionally, a foreign entity can conduct its public affairs
and be sure of immunity from local laws, regardless of any tensions
with the local government. 8 ' Dual certainty is at the core of the
FSIA's attempt to overcome years of deference to the foreign policy
75 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6606 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1487), By transferring immunity decisions to the
judiciary, litigants would be insured that verdicts "are made on purely legal grounds and
under procedures that insure due process." Id. The State Department would no longer
have to determine immunity in light of any potentially adverse political consequences
stemming from its ruling. Id.
76 Id. at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6611. An interesting argument not seen
in the Morgan Guaranty Trwt Co. decisions is the FSIA's continual reference to the immunity of "foreign governments" as an interchangeable term with the immunity of "foreign
states." See id. at 7-33, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606-33. Seemingly, the two
terms are not synonymous, since having an effective government is only a component of
statehood, but the free use of "foreign government" by Congress may be another indication of favoring a loose standard of statehood. Then again, it may only be careless drafting of the statute.
77 Id. at 32, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6631.
78 The FSIA waives the amount in controversy requirement present under the normal
diversity jurisdiction statute. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(1988) (normally a dispute must involve at least fifty thousand dollars before being heard
by the federal courts). Also, removal under § 1441(d) is allowed at the discretion of the
foreign state, even if other defendants are opposed to federal jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d) (1988); H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 75, at 32 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6631. Furthermore, the time limitations for filing removal actions are
waived under the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988).
79 See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 75, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6607.
80 Id.

81 See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the Second Circuit's decision undermines the goal of depoliticizing immunity determinations.
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agenda of the President.8 2 While the policies of the FSIA are adamantly stated throughout the legislative history, the statute's failure
to expressly direct the courts in their decisions regarding issues of
statehood jeopardizes Congress' goals in difficult cases involving
sovereignty.8 3
B.

Sovereignty and the Entity in Transition
1.

The Requirements of an "Effective Government" and
InternationalCapacity

Customary international law recognizes the international personalty of a foreign entity when it possesses the actual capacity to
self-govern. 84 The best evidence of a legitimate foreign state is the
presence of a stable political community consisting of centralized
legislative and administrative bodies. a5 A government does not have
to be well-defined or firmly in control to meet the criteria of statehood; it merely must exercise traditional governmental functions
86
and have the capacity to represent the entity in foreign relations.
Historically, international law takes a de minimus approach to the substantive components of an "effective government," ' 87 but existing
generally treated more fastates in danger of losing sovereignty 8are
8
vorably than newly emerging entities.
When dependent states are involved, 89 issues of sovereignty focus on how much control an entity relinquishes to a dominant state
or administering authority. 90 During its formative period, a transitional entity typically transfers its capacity to engage in international
relations to an established nation, 9 ' thus jeopardizing the final crite82 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 75, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6610.
83 See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
84 David Isenberg, Reconciling Independence and Security: The Long Term Status of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, 4 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 210, 222 (1985).
85 See BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 75.
86 RESTATEMENT (REvIsED), supra note 4, § 201 cmt. d.
87 Poland, Burundi, and Rwanda were admitted to the United Nations before their
respective governments were well organized. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 75. In the cases
of the Congo and Finland, anarchy prevailed at the time international recognition was
accorded to both nations. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 42-46 (1979).
88 CRAWFORD,
89

supra note 87, at 46.

Brownlie lists six levels of "dependence," ranging from complete subjugation of

nation under another, to conferring authority by legal title to another state for reasons of
convenience and economy. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 76-78.

90 Previously, complete independence was considered a requirement of statehood,
but the continuous existence of dependent relationships merged the notion of independence into the international capacity requirement. See id at 76. With the recognition of
free association as a viable alternative to independence, G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., 948 plen. mtg., Supp. No. 16, Annex (Principle VI) at 30, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 1541], international capacity is a more appropriate term, both substantively and semantically.
'1 See infra note 94.
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rion of statehood. 92 Although a legitimate state must have the practical capability to conduct international relations, a voluntary
conveyance of this attribute does not preclude a finding of sovereignty. 93 Traditionally, international law still confers "statehood" to
a dependent entity that peacefully transfers its international capacity
94
to another state.
Nevertheless, the sovereign status of Palau remains in doubt
even though the entity's achievements compare favorably with similar nations previously accorded statehood. 9 5 Despite any prior
trends in international law, cases involving entities in transition defy
the formation of any sound legal pattern 9 6 because of the inherent
conflict between relinquishing control and attaining sovereignty.
While a general definition of statehood exists, the fact-specific nature
of each inquiry allows a determinative body to redefine the critical
97
components of sovereignty to reach a desired result.

2. De Facto Sovereignty
Instead of attempting to discern the exact moment when governmental control or international capacity satisfactorily exists,
scholars argue that rigid applications of these criteria fail to provide
a realistic view of statehood. 98 Often an entity in transition undergoes difficult periods before it reaches the ultimate goal of formal
statehood; 99 however, a viable political community often directs the
territory during the interim stages of growth and self determination. 10 0 While full self-government may require the termination of
the dependent relationship, international personalty accrues during
92 A state must have "the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 4, § 201.
93 Id. § 201 cmt. e.
94 "Providing that the representation and agency exist in fact and in law, then there is
no formal difficulty in saying that the criterion... is satisfied." BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at

77-78 (Permanent Court of International Justice awarded sovereignty to Tunis and Morocco, after the protectorates entered a contractual relationship with France); See RESTATE-

MENT (REvISED), supra note 4, § 202 reporter's note 6 (examples of the Ukraine and
Byelorussia joining the United Nations despite the Soviet Union's complete control over
foreign affairs).
95 RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 4, § 201 reporter's note 4; Id. § 201 cmt. e.
The other protectorates and associated states similarly transferred their foreign relations'
rights by legal title. Id.
96 Id. § 201 cmt. a.
97 See infra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
98 See BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 82; Isenberg, supra note 84, at 222 (dependent states
currently "exercise defacto capacity in their own name and right," regardless of formal
recognition); CRAWFORD, supra note 87, 214-46 (dependent entity often makes steady progress in its self-governing capacity regardless of any agreement or recognition with the
administering state).
99 BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 82.
1o Id; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (Trust Territories were given primary control of internal matters and policy, subject to the United States' supervisory
powers).
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the movement towards independence or free association.' 0 ' Rather
than searching for the "single definable moment in time" that confers formal recognition, defacto sovereignty recognizes that political
development occurs periodically, with minimal legal relevance attaching at a single moment in time.102
The FSIA enhances the viability of defacto sovereignty by removing the requirement of recognition from statehood considerations.10 3 Formerly, the State Department had to officially declare an
entity was a foreign state before any legal benefits were conferred. 104
Without the burden of executive branch approval, the federal courts
are directed to consider the international community's general acceptance of an emerging entity's defacto capacity, 10 5 even though this
capacity may not equate to statehood.' 0 6 While defacto sovereignty
should solve the paradox discussed in the previous two sections of
this Note, the lack of an affecting moment where official title is conveyed remains a dominant concern to the federal courts.10 7
C. Case Applications Involving Sovereignty and the Trust Territories
1.

The De Facto Precedent in the Second Circuit

Although the status of the Trust Territories was not examined
by the Second Circuit prior to the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. decisions, the court previously adopted a favorable view of defacto sovereignty. In Murarka v. Bachrack Brothers Inc.,108 India was awarded
sovereignty even though the British government failed to recognize
the "state" at the time the complaint was filed. 10 9 Since the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity was not a part of United States
law until the passage of the FSIA, t 10 Justice Harlan had to overcome
the absence of formal recognition to support his argument for transitional statehood. While the court could have relied solely on Brit101 Isenberg, supra note 84, at 223 n.73. See also BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 82 (accrual is justifiable "both legally and practically"); CRAWFORD, supra note 87, at 238- 46 (examples of British colonies exercising defacto capacity despite the United Kingdom's claim
to legal sovereignty).
102 CRAWFORD, supra note 87, at 241. "[T]he distinction between status nascendi and
statehood cannot be very readily upheld." BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 82.
103 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 75, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606.
104

Id.

28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988) indicates that international law should be used to determine issues of statehood. When the international community monitors the development
of an entity in transition under legal title, its de facto capacity will not be denied. See
Isenberg, supra note 84, at 223; BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 82; see also infra notes 180-87
and accompanying text.
106 See infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
107 Essentially, courts have trouble deciding what comprises a "practical" state, given
the complex factual patterns inherent in each case and the lack of consistent legal gui105

dance. See

RESTATEMENT

(REVIsED),

supra note 4, § 201 cmt. a.

108 Murarka v. Bachrack Brothers, Inc., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954).
109 Id. at 550-52.
110 See supra note 103.
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ain's subsequent acknowledgement of Indian independence, II the
opinion clearly indicated sovereignty attached to India during its development. 12 Even though the Second Circuit used specific events
to support defacto statehood," t s Murarka clearly expressed its disdain
for ceremonial criteria: "[u]nless form rather than substance is to
govern, we think that in every substantial sense by the time this complaint was filed India had become an independent international entity. " 14 Thus, the United States District Court had jurisdiction over
the breach of contract action against the debtor partnership from
New Dehli. 15
2.

The Agency Cases

Since the formation of the Trusteeship System, the federal
courts have primarily analyzed the status of the Micronesian entities
in cases involving agency. Under a series of federal statutes, the appellate courts have reached near unanimity in concluding that the
Trust Territories are not agents of the United States capable of sustaining private causes of action. 16 Despite the consistency present
in the courts, the overall significance of each decision must be considered in light of the particular statute at issue and the general
scope of the agency relationship.
The Second Circuit commented that the Island of Kwajalein was
a "foreign country," and not an agent of the United States, regardless of the administering authority's role as trustee of the territory. 1 7 Since the Federal Torts Claims Act was geared only towards
the established sovereignty of the United States,t11 which admittedly
never included the Trust Territories,It° the court depended on statIIIThe

Second Circuit immediately affirmed the ephemeral nature of sovereignty es-

poused by Justice Frankfurter. Id. at 551; see supra note 19; see also Betancourt v. Mutual
Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 101 F. 305, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1900) (later declaration that Cuba
was free and independent overcomes period of United States occupation for diversity jurisdiction). Thus, once Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act in 1947, Murarka,
215 F.2d at 551, the subsequent decision could have rested solely on this event, given the
established concept of ephemeral sovereignty.

112 Murarka, 215 F.2d at 552.
11s The Murarka opinion emphasized that the exchange of ambassadors between Britain and India before the passage of the Independence Act amounted to at least de facto
recognition of the new government. Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.at 549.
116 See infra
notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
117 Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 936
(1958); seealso Brunell v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (same holding
for the Island of Saipan). Brunell provides an eloquent discussion distinguishing the term
"foreign country" from "foreign state," but concludes the distinction is irrelevant for the
purposes of the Federal Torts Claims Act. 77 F. Supp. at 72.
I8 Callas, 253 F.2d at 840.
119 See Draft Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 56, at 420 (noting that the United States
has never claimed sovereignty 'over Micronesia).
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utory interpretation and not a thorough examination of Micronesia's
status.
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit adopted a more comprehensive
approach in concluding that the local governments of the Trust Territories were not agencies of the United States Government. 120 After
dissecting the legislative history of the Internal Revenue Code, the
court elaborated on the general structure of the Trusteeship to support its holding.12' While the United States' role as the administering authority of Micronesia indicated an agency relationship to the
Fifth Circuit, 12 2 both the Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the fundamental objectives of the strategic trust
contradicted such a restrictive view of the islands' role and their selfgoverning capacity.1 23 The Trusteeship Treaty's basic purpose concentrates on giving the territories a progressively increasing share of
their internal governments, rather than tying the entities to a principal-agent status. 12 4 After all, the United States "[c]arries out the will
of the Micronesians, not that of the government or citizens of the
25
United States."'
3.

The Jurisdiction Cases

When the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether a branch of
the Palaun government was subject to federal jurisdiction, the court
adopted a strikingly different attitude towards the Trusteeship System. 1 26 In concluding that the Palaun judiciary was not a "foreign
court," and therefore had to honor the United States District Court's
limitation order,' 2 7 the court paid little attention to the region's self120 McComish v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 1323, 1326-29 (9th Cir. 1978). But see
Aradanas v. Hogan, 155 F. Supp. 546 (D. Haw. 1957) and In re Reyes, 140 F. Supp. 130 (D.
Haw. 1956) for immigration cases within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction that apply the
same limited reasoning as the Second Circuit cases.
121 McComish, 580 F.2d at 1326-29.
122 See Groves v. United States, 533 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1000 (1976). In Groves, the court concluded the Trust Territory government was an
agency of the United States because its operating revenue came exclusively from Congressional purse strings. Id. at 1384. Although the Fifth Circuit adamantly applied a restrictive
view of the Trusteeship System, the court's reliance on the expenditure theory largely
undermined its opinion. A year earlier, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that
exclusive funding created an agency relationship. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S.
807, 816 (1975).
123 See Gale v. Andrus, 643 F.2d 826, 831-33 (D.C. Cir. 1980); McComish, 580 F.2d at
1328-29. The crux of the agency issue turned on the objectives of the Trusteeship Treaty,
not the control exhibited by the United States under the document's specific provision.
Gale, 643 F.2d at 831.
124 McComish, 580 F.2d at 1328.
125 Gale, 643 F.2d at 831.
126 See Bowoon Sangsa Co. v. Micronesian Industrial Corp., 720 F.2d 595, 600-02 (9th
Cir. 1983).
127 Id. at 595.
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governing capacity.
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Instead of considering. the founding princi-

ples of the trust relationship, the majority in Bowoon Sangsa Co. v.
Micronesian Industrial Corp.129 required formal indications of Palau's
30
"foreign" status.'
As long as the Palaun people exercised their constitutional right
to reject the proposal for free association, the United States maintained the same authority to supervise and control the Republic.' s '
Without an explicit termination of the trust, any future increases in
Palau's governmental capacity or international participation would
be irrelevant given the court's limited focus on the original delineation of authority.13 2 The Ninth Circuit implied that a transitional entity can never be accorded defacto sovereignty, since statehood arises
33
from an enabling event, like the ratification of the Compact.'
While the majority claimed it consistently followed the district court
precedents, its unwavering adherence to formal indicia was a novel
approach to jurisdictional determinations involving foreign
entities. 134
V. Analysis of the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. Decision
In overruling the district court's finding of subject matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit's narrow view
of statehood and rejected Palau's status as a foreign sovereign under
128 Id. at 601. "The recent movement toward independence masks the extent to which
the courts of Palau are still dominated by the United States." Id.
129 Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 595.
IS0 See id. at 601. By only discussing the United States authority over the Palaun
branches of government, id. at 601-02, the majority opinion either implicitly rejected the
McComish focus, or had a convenient memory lapse. Judge Trask's dissent adamantly criticized the court's willingness to examine only the skeletal distribution of authority between
the United States and Palau, without focusing on Palau's development within the Trusteeship's structure. Id. at 603 (Trask, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 601; see also Sablan Constr. Co. v. Gov't of Trust Territory of Pac. Islands,
526 F. Supp. 135, 140 (D. N. Mar. I. 1981) (trusteeship arrangement confers only limited
sovereignty); World Communications Corp. v. Micronesian Telecommunications Corp.,
456 F. Supp. 1122, 1123 (D. Haw. 1978) (United States has practical sovereignty).
132 See Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 602. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the Micronesian Industrial Corporation's ("MIC") argument that the Trusteeship's goals necessitated
recognizing the Palau's judiciary as a "foreign court." Id. Although McComish heavily depended on the reasoning espoused by MIC, see supra note 124, the majority merely referred to the governmental framework created in 1968 to overcome the claim. Bowoon
Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 602; see supra note 47.
'33 Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 602.
1s4 Cf. Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 655 n.23 (D. Haw.
1973), modified, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975). Although
the court concluded that Saipan was not a "foreign country," as a result of the United
States' considerable exercise of control, it refused to comment on the future classification
of the Trust Territories. Id. at 656. "[T]his situation will probably change as a result of the
Micronesian Future Political Status Talks .
Id. at 655 n.23; see also Sablan Constr. Co.,
I..."
526 F. Supp. at 140 ("[S]overeignty is an elusive term of art rather than a legal expression
capable of precise definition."). See also supra note 123.
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section 1330 of the FSIA. 135 In the next section, Morgan Guaranty
36
will
Trust Co.'s decision to rely on formal indications of statehood
1
7
be compared to Judge Sweet's broader considerations 3 and the
analysis will concentrate on general international legal principles and
the two relevant documents: the Trusteeship Mandate and the FSIA.
A.

The Second Circuit's Approach to Statehood
1.

The Court's Flawed Requirement of Formal Indicia

Soon after the district court accorded Palau defacto sovereignty,
the territory's people again rejected the United States proposed
Compact of Free Association. 138 The Second Circuit emphasized
that the inability to ratify the new relationship undermined the lower
court's reasoning and signalled that the "status quo continue[d]."1 3 9
The absence of an event vesting sovereignty in the territory led to a
narrow analysis of the United States' continued authority over Palau's government. 140 As long as the future remained uncertain, the
lingering strategic trust arrangement subordinated the Republic's
proven achievements and its citizens' adamant desire for a more independent status. 14 1 The Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. opinion followed
the conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit eight years earlier: without formal indications of statehood, a court must return to the skeletal delineation of authority governing the limits of Palau's internal
42
and international capacity.'
After listing the basic components of statehood, the Second Circuit immediately concluded that the United States' capacity as administering authority of the trust removed the necessary element of
governmental control. 14 3 Although the court's rejection of complete
sovereignty was valid, 144 the opinion again stressed a rigid approach
to statehood, contrary to the general principles of international law.
135 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1247 (2d Cir.
1991).
136 Id. at 1244-45.
'37 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 713-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), vacated, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991).
138 See supra note 69.

139 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1244.
140 Id. at 1245; see Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 601-02.
141 Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 602 ("The recent decision by the people of Palau to
reject the free association compact indicates that the status of the island is uncertain ....
Prudence directs that we do not make a decision based on facts subject to such great
change."); see Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1244.
142 Compare Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1245 with Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720
F.2d at 601 (each stressing the continuing nexus between the administering authority and
the Trust Territory as a result of "failing" plebescites). Although Bowoon Sangsa Co. lim-

ited its focus to the Department of Interior's control over the Palaun judiciary, 720 F.2d at
601, the Second Circuit expanded the Ninth Circuit's analysis to include Palau's legislative
and executive branches. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1245.
143 See id.

144 Complete sovereignty is used in this context as the next step after de facto sover-
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Instead of examining Palau's considerable progress within the Trusteeship System, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. cited precedents to enforce the continuing viability of the skeletal framework created by
the United States." 4 5 By restricting its focus to the ultimate boundaries placed on Palau's independent capacity,' 4 6 and ignoring the Republic's substantive achievements, the Second Circuit contradicted
47
the ephemeral nature of statehood.'
Each assessment of statehood should reflect subsequent factual
changes within the Trusteeship's delineation of authority, since the
components of governmental control and international capacity are
not fixed in international law.' 48 Formalism nullifies any meaningful analysis of an individual criterion of statehood because actual
progress is rendered moot by the ceremonial boundaries. Both the
continued exercise of democracy within Palau 14 9 and the entity's increased role in international treaty making are negated by requiring
a jurisdictional moment that disassembles the trust's framework.' 5 0
Unless the United States voluntarily provides Palau with complete
self-governing capacity through a future secretarial order, the Second Circuit's decision allows only one way for sovereignty to be conferred: through the future ratification of the Compact of Free

Association.
2.

151

Precedents Favor a Flexible Approach

Although Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. heavily relied on the Ninth
Circuit's formal analysis of sovereignty, 15 2 the Second Circuit queseignty. See Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 639 F. Supp. at 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), vacated, 924
F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991).
145 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1245; see Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 601
(discussing Department of Interior's retained authority to appoint justices to Palau's High
Court); Saipan, 356 F. Supp. at 655 (D. Haw. 1973), modified, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975) (discussing United States' veto authority over legislation
inconsistent with its domestic laws, treaties, or international agreements).
146 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1245; see Secretarial Order No. 2918, supra
note 23, at 157-60 (refined in Secretarial Order No. 3039, supra note 47, at 28,117-18).
147 See supra notes 19 and 134.
148 See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 4, § 201 cmt. a.; see also supra notes 87 and

93-94 and their accompanying text for historical examples where statehood was conferred
despite minimal levels of governmental control and international capacity.
149 See Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 603 (TraskJ., dissenting). Judge Trask criticized
the majority's finding that the Palaun judiciary was not "foreign," because the Republic's
people continually proved their ability to choose an independent political course through
their own political process. Id.
150 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 708 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), vacated, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991). ("Palau has negotiated commercial and diplomatic treaties and agreements with several nations on a government-to-government basis, primarily concerning the management of the Pacific Island Fisheries, but also
concerning environmental protection treaties and grant agreements .... ). Palau has also
joined several international organizations. Id.
151 See Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1246.
152 See supra notes 141-42.
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tionably expanded the Bowoon Sangsa Co. holding. When the Ninth
Circuit had to decide whether to subject a Micronesian corporation
to a federal court's limitation order, the issue at hand was the capa53
bility of Palau's judiciary, not the status of the entire territory.'
While the Republic's transitional phase toward independence was
recognized, its judiciary often was confined to applying federal common law.' 5 4 Coupled with the Secretary of Interior's power to appoint the judges sitting on Palau's High Court, the pervasive
influence of American law dictated the Ninth Circuit's conservative
approach.1 55 Nevertheless, Bowoon Sangsa Co. only determined a single component of the governmental control element of statehood; it
did not preclude a broader examination of Palau's overall capac56
ity. 1

Given the de minimus governments supporting prior legitimate

sovereigns, the lack of an independent judiciary is merely one factor
in the totality of circumstances. 157 By adopting the Ninth Circuit's
adherence to formalist indicia, the Second Circuit refused to respect
the evolving nature of Palau's self-governing capacity and magnified
the flaws inherent in the Bowoon Sangsa Co. opinion.
The clear danger of adopting a rigid approach to statehood pervaded the precedents before the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. court.
The Second Circuit previously shunned a formalist attitude by conferring sovereignty to India, and based its decision on the substantive indicia acquired during the entity's transitional phase toward
complete independence.15 8 Although India satisfied the basic elements of statehood more readily than Palau, 159 Murarka's plain directives regarding how to approach difficult sovereignty questions
stood as the Second Circuit's only prior comment on the issue. Yet,
the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. court flatly ignored precedent by requiring ratification of the Compact of Free Association as a condition
60
precedent to statehood.
The other cases examining the sovereign capacity of the Trust
Territories took a more functional approach than the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. decision. While the Ninth Circuit examined the Palaun
153 Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 602.
154 Id.

155 Id. "Under these circumstances, the High Court is more analogous to a district
court which is subject to orders issued in conjunction with limitation proceedings than a
foreign court which is not." Id.

156 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), vacated, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991) (The district court was compelled to analyze
"whether Palau now possesses enough of the other (and perhaps collectively more significant) attributes of sovereignty ....
).
157 Bowoon Sangsa Co., 720 F.2d at 603 (Trask, J., dissenting); see supra note 87.
158 Murarka v. Bachrack Brothers, Inc., 215 F.2d 547, 550-51 (2d Cir. 1954); see supra
notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
159 See Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1246.
160 See id. at 1246. See supra notes 110-15 for the Second Circuit's prior rejection of
formalist approaches to statehood.
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judiciary very narrowly, the district courts within the jurisdiction acknowledged the ephemeral nature of statehood when addressing the
larger question of an entity's international presence. 16 1 Furthermore, the goals of the domestic statute relevant to each case necessarily influenced how broadly each court viewed the terms "foreign
state" or "foreign country."' 6 2 In an agency case, the Ninth Circuit
heeded the district court's analysis by liberally defining "foreign
country" to effectuate the purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code. 163 Also, before the District of Columbia Circuit commented
on the general status of the Trust Territories, it examined the specific directives of the Freedom of Information Act and the Administrative Procedure Act to glean the scope of the trustee's international
standing.164

Conversely, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 's requirement of formal
indicia appears nowhere in the FSIA, 16 5 and implicitly circumvents
the statute's policies. Once the court determined that the failure to
ratify the Compact of Free Association inherently prevented sovereignty, no further attempt was made to address Judge Sweet's cogent
statutory analysis.' 6 6 The district court's finding of de facto sovereignty was predicated on the FSIA's goal of achieving uniformity in
cases involving foreign entities.' 6 7 Following the line of agency
cases, the lower court promoted a flexible standard for statehood determinations to effectuate the statute's repeated preference for fed68

eral jurisdiction. 1

3.

The Second Circuit's Disdainfor De Facto Sovereignty

To combat the district court's dual analysis of de facto sovereignty and the goals of the FSIA, 169 the Second Circuit turned the
Murarka case around to comport with a formal test of statehood.
Although Murarka explicitly chose to base jurisdiction on India's
161 See Sablan Constr. Co. v. Gov't of Trust Territory of Pac. Islands, 526 F. Supp.
135, 140 (D.N. Mar. I. 1981); Saipan v. United States Dep't of Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645,
655 n.23 (D. Haw. 1973), modified, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003
(1975) (stating that the Palaun situation is likely to change and refusing to determine the
exact status of the territory).
162 Sablan Constr. Co., 526 F. Supp. at 137-38. "The term 'foreign country' is not a
technical one and the sense to which it is used must be determined by reference to the
purpose of the legislation." Id. at 138 (quoting Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1,
5-6 (1932)).
163 McComish v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 1323, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1978).
164 Gale v. Andrus, 643 F.2d 826, 832-34 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
165 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1988).
166 See Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1243-46 (2d
Cir. 1991) (the court only cited the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988), and the
commercial exception clause. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988)).
167 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 716 (S.D.N.Y.
1986), vacated, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991).
168 Id. at 716. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
169 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 639 F. Supp. at 714-16.
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proven capacity to self-govern before Great Britain's ultimate recognition,' 70 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. merged the case's support for de
facto sovereignty into ceremonialism. Since "full sovereignty was imminent and inevitable,"' 17 1 and was symbolized by an exchange of
ambassadors, tangible proof demonstrated that India's "ties with
Great Britain were in the process of withering away."' 72 Thus, the
Second Circuit emphasized formalist rituals rather than the prior
court's clear intent to avoid the recognition requirement of state73
hood still present in 1954 international law.'
While India's emergence from Great Britain provided a compelling and virtually soundproof case of de facto sovereignty, the Second
Circuit's interpretation of Murarka stripped the future validity of the
case's affirmation of transitional statehood. By demanding a vesting
event before awarding federal jurisdiction to Palau under section
1330 of the FSIA, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. resurrected a theoretical
limitation to sovereignty contrary to the practical goals of the defacto
standard. 74 As long as a dependent entity governs with the approval of its people and exhibits sufficient internal and international
capacity indicative of a legitimate state, "to deny recognizing that
entity as a 'sovereign state' is a pragmatic futility.' 7 5 Determining
what level of control suffices to place an entity in the de facto spectrum must be done by a fact-specific analysis of each case, but international law clearly recognizes that "the principle of effectiveness
dictates acceptance . . . before and after statehood is firmly estab-

lished."1 7 6 Placing a free association proposal before Palau's people
for approval certainly seems to demonstrate the merits of the Republic's government to a degree warranting de facto status.' 7 7 The
United States' repeated attempts to grant Palau a more independent
relationship clearly indicates the Republic already achieved the capacity to be a foreign state.' 78 Yet, the Second Circuit negated the
179
Republic's status solely because of the outcome of a plebescite.
Somehow, the entity's use of its constitutional process, allowing the
free will of the people to control whether Palau would be subject to a
170 Murarka v. Bachrack Brothers, Inc., 215 F.2d 547, 550-51 (2d Cir. 1954).
'7' Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1246 (quoting Murarka, 215 F.2d at 552).
172 Id.
173 Murarka, 215 F.2d at 552.
174 See Mark C. Hendricks, Note, Birth of a Nation: The Republic of Palau is Recognized as a
Foreign Sovereign Under the Foreign Sovereign Imuunities Act of 1976, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 709,
717 (1987).
175 Id.
176 BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 82 (emphasis added).

177 See Isenberg, supra note 84, at 223.
178 "The People of Palau, acting through their duly elected government established
under their constitution, are self-governing." Compact, supra note 14, tit. I art. I, § I11,
100 Stat. at 3679 (emphasis added).
179 See supra note 69; see also Bowoon Sangsa Co. v. Micronesian Industrial Corp., 720
F.2d 595, 603 (9th Cir. 1983) (Trask, J., dissenting).
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nuclear presence, nullified the element of governmental control satisfactorily present before the vote. Levels of international personalty
logically cannot be reduced by an exercise of the qualities that supply
the personalty.
B.

Implications of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
1. Formalism Contradicts the Policies of the FSIA

On the surface, the Second Circuit's analysis clarifies the definition of a "foreign state" under the FSIA,' 8 0 and removes the problem of determining what level of governmental control and
international capacity satisfy the defacto standard.' 8 ' By requiring
formal evidence of statehood, a court should theoretically avoid
political considerations and solely examine tangible factors to decide
proper jurisdiction.' 8 2 However, as Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. demonstrates, the Second Circuit's demand for ceremonial indicia of sovereignty achieves the opposite result. The court repoliticizes the
FSIA by reducing the jurisdictional question to a single consideration: the failure of the parties to overcome the nuclear obstacle
within the Compact. As long as the United States treats the nuclear
reservation as a condition precedent to granti.g Palau a more independent status,' 8 3 sovereignty will remain in abeyance. The executive branch's policy interests continue to compromise Palau's
viability as an international state. Sovereignty depends either on its
people approving the Compact in a future plebescite or having the
United States confer formal recognition to Palau before resolving
84
the debate over the military's nuclear capacity in the Pacific Basin.'
By failing to account for Palau's actual exercise of self-government, the Second Circuit contravenes the primary purpose of the
FSIA. When Congress codified the restrictive principle of sovereign
immunity, it clearly intended to "reduc[e] the foreign policy implications of immunity determinations and assur[e] litigants that these
often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds."' 8 5 The
judiciary, not the State Department, was directed to take full control
over immunity determinations,' 8 6 which essentially include deciding
which entities are eligible for the potential benefits of the FSIA. Despite these clear directives, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. allows the exec180 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988). The FSIA does not attempt to expand on the traditional definition of statehood developed in international law. Id. §§ 1602-1603.
181 See Hendricks, supra note 174, at 717.
182 See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 4, at § 201 cmt. a.

183 Armstrong & Hills, supra note 67, at 488 n.17.
184 Unless a dramatic change occurs in the United States' foreign policy toward Palau,
the condition precedent in the Compact will not be removed. See Compacts of Free Associa-

tion, supra note 14, at 152 n.16.
185 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 75, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606.
186 Id.
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utive branch to control a dependent state's international capacity.
Unless the United States' policy requirements are satisfied, the State
Department can forever delay the jurisdictional moment necessary
for Palau's eligibility under section 1330 of the Act. The Second Circuit's formalist test effectively reinstates recognition as a fifth criterion of statehood, even though- Congress expressly adopted the
restrictive principle to avoid requiring the State Department's approval of a transitional entity.' 8 7 Under the court's analysis, the Republic is better off being a hand-puppet or a ventriloquist's dummy,
rather than being an entity exercising democracy and accruing international personalty.
2. Implications Involving the Trusteeship Treaty
Along with undermining the goals of the FSIA, the Second Circuit's holding seriously compromises the basic principles guiding the
United States' trust relationship with the Republic of Palau. While
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. centered on a jurisdictional question not
specifically addressing the legality of the United States conduct toward Micronesia, the Second Circuit's reliance on the Compact logically necessitates an examination of the proposal's validity. Yet, by
focusing solely on formalist indicia, the Second Circuit never considered the goals of the Trusteeship Mandate.18 8 Although treaties are
part of the "supreme Law of the Land,"' 8 9 the court's formalist test
aborted a more thorough analysis of the United States' obligations as
administering authority of the strategic trust.
The district court's support of Palau's defacto sovereignty largely
depended on the two statutes relevant to the Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co. case: the FSIA and the Trusteeship Mandate. After concluding
that Congress favored a liberal definition of statehood, 190 Judge
Sweet emphasized the boundaries of the United States' role in the
Pacific Basin. 19 The trust was created under the premise that it was
only temporary, and Palau was to "remain under international supervision only until it [chose], by an act of self-determination, a more
permanent status."' 9 2 Furthermore, the essential component of the
187 See id. The Second Circuit's analysis also contradicted the rejection of recognition
as a component of sovereignty as espoused by commentators in public international law.
RESTATEMENr (REVIsED), supra note 4, § 202 cmt. b.

188 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237, 1243-47 (2d Cir.
1991). While the court described the basic structure of the trust's delineation of powers,
the basic principles governing the arrangement were never discussed. Id.
189 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
190 See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
'9' Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706, 714-16
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), vacated, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991).
192 Id. at 714. Although the large debt incurred by Palau in financing the power plant
caused the Republic to deny sovereignty on appeal, see supra note 41, Palau's supplemental
brief admitted: "Palau submits that the aspirations of its people to become sovereign con-
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United States' fiduciary responsibility as a trustee for Micronesia was
to "promote... the trust territory toward self-government or independence," and provide "the trust territory a progressively increasing
share" of internal and international governmental capacity.' 9 3 The
federal courts have consistently analogized the United States' responsibilities to the duties of a normal trustee, with the same primary
obligation to nurture development and comport with the beneficiary's freely expressed wishes. 19 4 Nevertheless, by permitting the
Compact to act as a condition precedent to statehood, the court allowed the United States to place its military interests ahead of the
democratically expressed will of the Palaun people, and keep sovereignty in perpetual abeyance.
The Second Circuit's rubber-stamp approval of the Compact's
nuclear rights reservation may be legally defended by the United
States concurring responsibility to maintain peace and security in the
Pacific Basin. 19 5 Supporters of the Reagan administration's unyielding stance towards Palau argued that an indeterminate duration of
the "mutual security arrangement" was essential to satisfy the defense obligations of article 76.196 The Compact was viewed as the
opportunity to "weave into the whole cloth the somewhat disparate
strands of United States policy and law . . . -197 Despite the State
Department's altruistic statements regarding the ultimate aims of
stabilizing Micronesia, the supremacy of the United States' personal
interests was clear throughout the Compact's negotiation period: "If
Palau gets away with being a nuclear free zone, everybody else is
198
going to want to do it."
Although the United States has an obligation to promote international peace under the Trusteeship Agreement, the Second Circuit's endorsement of the Compact's military proposal fails to
address the legal and practical flaws of the United States' position.
tinue to make such sovereignty inevitable." Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 924 F.2d at 1246.
See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
193 Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9, art. 6, 61 Stat. at 3302 (emphasis added); see
U.N. CHARTER art. 76.
194 Gale v. Andrus, 643 F.2d 826, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see McComish v. Commissioner, 580 F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (9th Cir. 1978).
195 Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 9, art. 5, 61 Stat. at 3302; U.N..CHARTER art.
76.
196 Armstrong & Hills, supra note 67, at 487-88.
197 Howard L. Hills, Compact of Free Associationfor Micronesia: Constitutional and International Law Issues, 18 INT'L L. 583, 601 (1984). The author served as Legal Counsel and
Defense Advisor to the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations. Id. at 583.
198 See Compacts for Free Association, supra note 14, at 158. The Reagan Administration
also accused the Palaun anti-nuclear groups of stirring up a "false consciousness," substituting the true free will of the voters supporting the Compact. Id. This argument appears
particularly hollow in light of the continued failure of the plebescites to reach 75% approval, despite the increasing economic burden imposed by not enacting the Compact. See
infra
notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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Assuming that the United States' nuclear reservation provision actually promotes peace and stability in the Pacific Basin,' 9 9 the fact that
the reservation is contrary to the expressed wishes of the Palaun people may still nullify its legal validity. The United Nations' resolutions
on the acceptable termination process for dependent state agreements indicates that self-determination is the foremost concern during the transition to free association. 200 While the General
Assembly's statements usually do not constitute international law 20 1
and are not always directly applicable to matters within the Security
Council's domain, 20 2 scholars support their relevance to the Trusteeship Mandate. 20 3 Additionally, the United Nations Charter states
that the local interests of the Trust Territories are "paramount," and
any obligation, including furthering international peace, must be accomplished to promote these interests. 20 4 Unfortunately, the failure
of the Trusteeship Treaty to create a specific pecking order within
the administering authority's four basic responsibilities under article
76 leaves room for the limited legal argument that furthering international security does not have to comport with the interests of the
199 This Note does not take this position. See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying
text.
200 G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 90, Principle VII; G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., plen. mtg. 1883, Supp. No. 16, Annex (Principle I), at 30, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970)
[hereinafter G.A. Res. 2625]. G.A. Res. 1541 states:
Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the
peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes. It should be one which respects the individuality and the
cultural characteristics of the territory and its peoples, and retains for the
people of the territory which is associated with an independent State freedom to modify the status of that territory through the expression of their will
by democratic means and through constitutional processes.
G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 90, Principle VII.
201 HENKIN, supra note 6, at 115. Contrary to this general directive, G.A. 2625 was
intended to codify customary law. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 200, introductory statement
(The General Assembly "affirmed the importance of the progressive development and
codification of the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States."). G.A. Res. 2625 declares:
By virtue of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the
Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine,
without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
Id. Principle I. See A. John Armstrong, The Emergence of the Micronesians into the International
Community: A study of the Creation of a New National Entity, 2 BROOK. J. INr' L. 207, 233-39
(1979) (provides an excellent summary of the juridical value of the General Assembly Resolutions relevant to Palau).
202 Hills, supra note 197, at 602-03; Armstrong, supra note 201, at 234 (contending
that only G.A. Res. 2625 has juridical value to the Trusteeship, although the other resolutions have political value).
203 Hills, supra note 197, at 602-03; Armstrong, supra note 201, at 234.
204 U.N. CHARTER art. 73. Again the relevance of a Charter article not directly within
the strategic trust system, id. arts. 75-91, has been questioned, but any distinction between
other trusts and the Micronesian trust "relate primarily to the allocation of functions between the General Assembly and the Security Council." Hills, supra note 197, at 603.
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Palaun people.2 0 5
If the Second Circuit's approval of the Compact's nuclear reservation withstands a theoretical legal argument, it must fail when the
events surrounding the attempts to ratify free association are examined. Instead of furthering international peace and security, the
Compact controversy divided Palau into two distinct and often vio20 6
lent factions, and threatened the future stability of the region.
Once the Republic's High Court affirmed the constitutional validity
of Palau's nuclear approval clause,20 7 the voting majority resorted to
violence and coercion to ensure receiving the nearly two billion dollars in United States aid associated with the Compact. 20 8 Since the
future development of Palau's meager infrastructure hinged directly
on the United States' monetary pledges, 20 9 political and social chaos
surrounded recent plebescites and signalled the true disruption of
"peace and stability" in the Pacific Basin. 210 A mission sent by the
International Commission of Jurists to supervise the plebescite pro205 See Armstrong, supra note 201, at 229. An argument can be made that the United
Nations created a hierarchy of interests for non self-governing territories in general, see
U.N. CHARTER art. 73, and specifically chose not to do the same for the strategic trust; but
considering the pure fiduciary nature of the administering authority's role, and the consistent legal and scholarly interpretations favoring self-determination, furthering Palau's expressed wishes should still be the foremost responsibility of the United States. See supra
notes 194 and 200-04 and their accompanying text.
206 McKibben, supra note 57, at 277 n. 109; Compacts of Free Association, supra note 14, at
155 nn.37-40 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
208 Compacts of Free Association, supra note 14, at 155 nn.37-40; see Compact, supra note
14, tit. II, arts. I-I, §§ 21 l(a)-(f), 22 1(b), 100 Stat. at 3687-88, 3690 (economic aid provisions documented a consistent monetary influx over the first fifteen years of the Compact's
existence). Furthermore, the United States promised to establish a Palau National Fund,
providing fifteen million dollars annually for the remaining thirty-five years of the free
association arrangement. See Compact, supra note 14, tit. II, art. I § 211(f), 100 Stat. at
3688. In return for the United States long-term economic assistance, the military's right to
harbor nuclear aircraft and vessels was extended to a concurrent fifty-year period. Id. tit.
IV., art. II, § 453, 100 Stat. at 3700.
209 McKibben, supra note 57, at 279. Palau asked for United States assistance to relieve the government's debt owed to the bank syndicate, to build a hospital for the archipelago, and to improve local law enforcement. Id. By tying potential aid packages to the
nuclear reservation provision in the Compact, the United States may be violating its fiduciary responsibility to establish an adequate infrastructure, id. at 279 n.121, especially considering the fact that Palau is the only entity in Micronesia without a modern hospital. Id.
210 The events preceding theJune 1987 plebescite exemplify the complete breakdown
of the Compact ratification process. Compacts of Free Association, supra note 14, at 155.
Statements made by Palaun legislators to the U.S. House of Representatives described the
tremendous pressure they were under to force the Compact's passage: "I voted for the
enabling legislation on these two plebescites only because I feared for my life." Id. (quoting
Santos Olikong, Speaker of the House of Delegates, before the Subcomm. on Insular and
Int'l Affairs (July 23, 1987) (unpublished document at Harv. Int'l L.J.) (emphasis in original)). Immediately after the plebescite only attained 68% of the popular vote, President
Salii suspended half of the government work force for five months and drastically cut the
archipelago's power and water supplies. d. at 155 n.38. These cutbacks in basic necessities were criticized as a method of creating undue pressure to vote for the Compact in the
upcoming August plebescite, id., which also failed, but achieved a 5% gain in approval.
McKibben, supra note 57, at 277 n.1 10.
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cess concluded that there was a "substantial breakdown in the legislative and judicial processes," through "illegal and improper
interference . . .[including] acts of intimidation and violence."12'
The United States' only response to the progressive breakdown of
internal peace in Palau was to cut off negotiations and adamantly
state that the nuclear transit reservation was not subject to compromise. 2t 2 The parties remain at an impasse, 21 3 as the unyielding interests of the United States continue to subvert its fiduciary
responsibility to promote development and to preserve peace in
Palau.
VI.

Conclusion
In deciding whether the Republic of Palau was a legitimate foreign state to satisfy the requirements for federal jurisdiction under
section 1330 of the FSIA, the Second Circuit had available the tools
of legislative history, the Trusteeship Mandate Treaty, and the general directives of international law. Yet, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.
adopted a formal test of statehood that advanced only the foreign
policy interests of the United States. The district court's finding of de
facto sovereignty comported with case precedents favoring a flexible
approach to statehood and incorporated the underlying goals of the
FSIA and the Trusteeship System. By respecting the proven capacity
of transitional entities to self-govern, Judge Sweet's opinion correctly depoliticized the issue of statehood and respected the United
States' fiduciary responsibility under the Mandate Treaty. While
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. 's clear disdain for defacto sovereignty sim-

plified future questions of statehood, the court's limited focus negated Palau's practical achievements and contravened the FSIA by
resurrecting the recognition element of statehood from the dead. By
requiring formal indications of statehood, the Second Circuit promoted the political manipulation of Palau and jeopardized the future
ability of transitional entities to enjoy the deserved incidents of
sovereignty.
HENRY MICHAEL PERLOWSKI

211 Id. at 278 n. 118 (quoting Statement of U.S. Representative Ron de Lugo on H.R.J.
RES. 597, The Palau Compact of Free Association Implementation Act, in the U.S. House
of Representatives, at 19 (Oct. 6, 1988)).
212 Id. at 278.
213 Id.

